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Strategic Lobbying: The Nature 
of Legislator/Lobbyist Relations 
Adam J. Newmark 
Appalachian State University 
This paper explores lobbying roles based on a survey of lobbyists in ten 
states. Lobbyists employ a variety of tactics in their interactions with 
legislators that can be characterized along two dimensions, one based 
on how personal the relationship is, and the other based on the extent 
that information is exchanged between these actors. The findings sug-
gest that there are only a few good ole boy lobbyists, who rely solely on 
pe rsonal appeal strategies . Instead, there is a mix of those who are 
amateurs, those that use information based appeal strategies, and those 
that appear to use both personal relationships and information-based 
app eals in their interactions with legislators. This allows us to examine 
the specific activities that lobbyists use in their dealings with legisla-
tors, as well as the general appeal strategies that they use. 
DIMENSIONALITY OF LEGISLAT OR/L OBBYIST INTERACT IONS 
Political scientists have long recognized that relationships between legislators and lobbyists are critical to achieving objectives (Heinz et al. 1993). The good ole boy style of 
lobbying best epitomized the use of relationships in these ex-
changes (Rosenthal 2001 ). Though there has been wide discus-
sion of the decline in the good ole boy style of lobbying, little 
empirical work has examined this decline and what has replaced 
it. To what extent has there been a decline in lobbying strategies 
that are primarily based on personal appeals? Additionally, as 
many scholars have noted, lobbyists are important suppliers of 
information to legislators who lack the time, money, and perhaps 
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inclination, to research every issue (Kingdon 1973, Matthews 
and Stimson 1975). Thus, information is an important commodi-
ty for lobbyists to convey to legislators. 
Lobbyists are of particular interest to political scientists, the 
media, politicians, and other actors given the recent string of 
good government reforms in the states (tem1 limits , lobbying and 
ethics regulations). In an effort to curb unethical or illegal politi-
cal behaviors, many states have reformed their lobbying laws 
following scandals involving lobbyists and members of the legis-
lature. Another reason to further explore relationships between 
lobbyists and legislatures is that much of the literature on interest 
group and PAC influence on decision-making is inconclusive in 
finding such a linkage (Smith 1995; Baumgartner and Leech 
1998). The conflicting findings in this literature may result from 
an inadequate understanding of the core relationships between 
these political actors. 
This paper assesses whether state lobbying tactics are pri-
marily based on personal appeals, information, or a combination 
of the two. Scholars owe much to Zeigler and Baer's (1969) 
work on amateur and professional lobbying, yet little research 
has addressed the nature of the profession beyond classifying 
lobbyists by type ( contract lobbyist, legislative liaison, or in-
house). 1 These classifications are important, but how these lob-
bying types use certain appeal strategies and how this fits into 
our schema of professionalization needs further attention. The 
first portion of the analysis explores the nature and dimensionali-
ty of lobbying relationships. That is, what are the defining com-
ponents of relationships? Next, based on these dimensions, 
lobbyists are classified according to the kinds of behaviors typi-
cal of the underlying dimensions identified. Finally, I examine 
1 For exceptions, see Schlozman and Tierney (1986), Nownes and Freeman (1998a; 
1998b), and Thomas and Hrebenar 2004). 
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the differences in the typical lobbying strategies employed by 
each of these types of lobbyist. 
Information Provision and Personal Relationshi ps 
Many studies have examined how lobbyists attempt to per-
suade legislators through information provision (Milbrath 1963; 
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Austen-Smith 1993; Wright 1996; 
Ainsworth 2002). Early research on lobbying viewed interest 
groups as having little influence on legislators, and access to 
lawmakers and the policy process was usually limited to those 
organizations that had similar views as legislators in the first 
place. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963), for example, viewed in-
terests as relatively innocuous "service bureaus" with limited 
funds and marginal influence. Milbrath's (1963) examination of 
contract lobbyists sought to uncover how these actors perceived 
the effectiveness of various lobbying tactics. More recently, in-
terest group scholars have pushed the focus on tactics to better 
understand the approaches used in dealing with legislators (Berry 
1977; Walker 1991; Nownes and Freeman 1998a). Rosenthal 
(2001) and Browne (1985) note the importance of access and 
interaction in the relationship between lobbyists and legislators. 
Termed the "contact game," lobbyists employ a multitude of 
strategies to achieve their objectives and facilitate deal-making 
(1985). 
Schlozman and Tierney (1986), Walker (1991), Kollman 
(1998), and Nownes and Freeman (1998a) have also furthered 
our understanding of lobbying tactics. Baumgartner and Leech 
(1998) summarize these extant findings on interest group and 
lobbying tactics suggesting that lobbyists engage in a variety of 
activities like giving testimony at hearings, having person-to-
person contact, utilizing informal contacts (Schlozman and Tier-
ney 1986; Heinz et al. 1993), presenting research (Schlozman 
and Tierney 1986; Berry 1977), forming coalitions with other 
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groups (Hojnacki 1997; Gray and Lowery 1998), serving on ad-
visory boards, and 'contacting agency personnel' (Kollman 
1998).2 Nownes and Freeman find that many techniques are used 
in lobbying, and they often involve direct contact with legisla-
tors, helping to draft legislation, and they "[alert] state legislators 
to the effects of a bill on their districts" (1998b, 1190). 
The importance of information is also stressed in the voting 
cue literature, as we know that lobbyists and interest groups are 
critical sources of information for legislators at both the national 
(Kingdon 1973; Matthews and Stimson 1975) and state levels 
(Ray 1982; Songer et al. 1985; Gray and Lowery 2000). Esterl-
ing (2001) found that members of Congress seek out lobbyists 
with specialized information, which indicates the importance of 
expertise in information provision. Even when the lobbyists are 
not the experts, they can provide specialists who may deal direct-
ly with legislators or testify before legislative committees (Ro-
senthal 2001). Lobbyists also possess information on how a 
policy or piece of legislation will affect the member's district 
and how constituents view such matters (Kingdon 1973; Koll-
man 1998). 
Other scholars have stressed the importance of relationships 
and have examined the role of friendships in the legislative 
process (Patterson 1959; Matthews 1960; Baker 1980; Jewell 
and Patterson 1985; Caldiera and Patterson 1987). Baker (1960) 
discusses the inseparable nature of political and personal rela-
tionships in the U.S. Senate, and Matthews (1960) notes the im-
portance of personal relationships on legislative outcomes. 
Social psychologists have also addressed personal relationships 
2 See Milbrath (1963, 41) and Beny (1977, 212) for differences between tactics and strat-
egies. Tactics refer to activities-meeting with legislators, testifying at hearings, or using 
litigation-undertaken by lobbyists (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Strategies in-
volve the use of these tactics in conjunction with relevant issues and the interest envi-
ronment within which activities take place. 
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in a number of contexts. According to Kelley and his colleagues, 
"a close relationship is one of strong, frequent, and diverse inter-
depende nce that lasts over a considerable period of time" (1983, 
38). And the key to personal relationships is that they involve 
unique individuals who cannot be replaced if the relationship is 
to be sustained (Hinde 1979). Hinde (1979) notes that relation-
ships involve repeated interactions, whereby past encounters in-
fluence existing interactions, which in turn affect future 
exchanges. 
The good ale boy style of lobbying is an excellent example 
of a relati onship that is personal in nature. Alan Rosenthal de-
scribes these good ale boys, "whose modus operandi is the three 
Bs-bour bon , broads, and beefsteaks. These lobbyists are known 
also as the ' old bulls;' their approach is that of the ' fixer.' They 
are also ' full service lobbyists' because they try to take care of 
the vario us needs of the legislators" (2001, 38) . There is no 
doubt that this type of behavior has declined, and, in many states, 
likely no longer exists at all due to reforms. For example, a num-
ber of scholars have looked at efforts to regulate lobbyists in re-
cent years (Hunter, Wilson, and Brunk 1991; Brinig , Holcombe, 
and Schw artzstein 1993; Lowery and Gray 1997; Rosenson 
2005; Newm ark 2005; 2008). Still, lobbyists attend social events 
with legislators, including a number of activities such as dining, 
sports games, or travel (Rosenthal 2001). Though these observa-
tions are often derived from survey research or interviews, much 
of these observations are anecdotal, and perhaps we do not fully 
understan d the nature of these relationships. 
UNDERSTANDING LOBBYING ROLES 
Lobbyists engage in a number of activities in dealing with 
their legislative counterparts, and the above discussion suggests 
that many of these can be categorized as personal appeal strate-
gies or information provision. For example, activities such as 
VOL. 37 2008 
6 NEWMARK 
. dining or attending sporting events are clearly personal in nature. 
Although the good ale boy style of lobbying may be a thing of 
the past, personal relationships are still a necessary part of the 
lobbying profession. Conversely, writing legislation, serving on 
advisory boards, or providing information about policy implica-
tions are information-based tactics and are also common. 
Thus, there are conceptually two constructs; but, how are 
these constructs related? The first conception is that there is a 
good deal of independence between these constructs. That is, we 
can conceive of relationships along two dimensions based on 
what the literature, lobbyists, and legislators tell us. The purpose 
here is to assess empirically whether there are two constructs. A 
long history of lobbying studies emphasizes the importance of 
cultivating relationships and the critical role of lobbyists provid-
ing information to legislators. Nonetheless, these constructs are 
not completely unrelated because of the enduring nature of rela-
tionships. Once a legislator accepts information from a lobbyist, 
and that information is not misleading or erroneous, a relation-
ship is fostered. The legislator will more easily trust the lobbyist 
on the next exchange, which facilitates a more personal relation-
ship and a greater degree of information acceptance in subse-
quent meetings. Trust is a crucial component in any personal 
relationship (Cialdini 1993), friend or otherwise. Trust in the 
individual will likely lead to trust in the information that that 
person provides or in advice that they give. Even the good ale 
boy style of lobbying required an element of trust, as a legislator 
is unlikely to accept gifts from someone with whom they have 
no confidence. Violations of this trust can also end a relation-
ship. 
Thus, the dimensions are not zero-sum, and in fact, having 
personal ties should increase the likelihood of information provi-
sion. It is also likely that a lobbyist who uses both personal and 
information-based appeal strategies is more likely to engage in a 
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greater variety of activities ranging from attending sporting 
events to helping to draft legislation. Thomas and Hrebenar 
(2004), for example, note the variability in tactics of lobbyists 
today indicating that they rely on a host of direct and indirect 
personal and information-based appeal strategies. Consider a 
personal appeal strategy like dining with legislators, which is 
clearly indicative of the good ole boy style of lobbying. It is 
probable that a lobbyist who can combine inf onnation based ac-
tivities with personal tactics is more likely engage in any single 
personal behavior. They should also engage in a greater number 
of activities than someone who relies on only a personal or in-
formation based set of strategies. Similarly, drafting legislation 
or serving on advisory boards should more likely occur if the 
lobbyist can combine information based and personal appeal 
strategies, rather than relying on only the former. 
So, how does this fit into our understanding of lobbying 
roles? Much of the early work on the profession viewed lob-
byists as either amateurs or professionals. Zeigler and Baer 
(1969) examined professionalism of both lobbyists and legisla-
tors and noted that lobbying was deemed a "marginal occupa-
tion," which is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. Deprutment of 
Labor did not even have a classification for the profession at the 
time. They did, however, argue that lobbying professionalism 
referred to skill in the profession, which was a function of lobby-
ing experience; skill and experience increased the frequency of 
interaction between these actors. 
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1964) offer a description of profes-
sionalism in terms of the characteristics of certain corporations 
that facilitate their lobbying efforts. Asking who the profession-
als were compared to the non-professionals, one interviewee in 
their study reported, "You know, we are just amateurs at this 
game." The professionals, on the other hand, are "People like the 
Ford people. We just have a typewriter and a mimeograph ma-
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chine, and they have all sorts of money and resources" (342). 
Thus, money and resources are critical for lobbying professional-
ism and information provision. 
More recent research has further developed the concept of 
lobbying professionalism. Rosenthal (2001) reports that there has 
been an increase in full-time lobbying, the number of firms of-
fering lobbying services, and an increase in specialization of 
firms. In some states, these firms conduct a large share of the 
lobbying activity in front of the state legislature (Gray and Lo-
wery 1996). Contract lobbying has become more business-like, 
and many firms believe they are advantaged by specialized ser-
vices that they can offer their clients. Wright (1996) notes that 
these "hired guns" may have better connections and greater 
access to legislators. This fits into classifications of lobbying 
types in Thomas and Hrebenar's (2004) on-going study of state 
lobbying. These authors suggest that contract lobbyists are hired 
for a fee, represent a multitude of clients, and often have expe-
rience in state government and in other lobbying activities. They 
also classify in-house lobbyists as those who serve as a lobbyist 
for a business, organization, or association; they typically have 
experience in the field they represent. Another type, the legisla-
tive liaison, represents local, state, and federal agencies before 
the legislature. Perhaps less professional are those lobbyists who 
Thomas and Hrebenar (2004) classify as citizen or cause lob-
byists or those who are ' self-styled' or lobby for pet projects. 
lf lobbying appeal strategies are based on two dimensions, 
perhaps we should rethink our classifications of lobbyists' strat-
egies. Then we can consider how the different types of lobbyists 
use different appeal strategies. From the perspective of the lob-
byist, the best possible strategy is to use all available appeal 
strategies when interacting with legislators. These individuals, 
whom I have termed multi-tactic lobbyists, probably engage in a 
variety of social activities like doing favors for legislators, meet-
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ing socially, or attending sporting events with them. They also 
engage in information-based activities like providing information 
on policy, helping to draft legislation, and serving on advisory 
boards. Thus, the multi-tactic lobbyist likely has worked as a 
lobbyist for a number of years, has had a long term relationship 
with legislators, has frequent contact with them, and a few may 
even have experience as a legislator. They are most likely ambi-
tious and are ready to provide information for legislators who 
seek information from them. In addition to having experience in 
their profession, many of these lobbyists have established a net-
work of contacts to help them achieve their objectives (Heinz et 
al. 1993). The multi-tactic approach should most likely be used 
by contract lobbyists or well-connected business executives be-
cause of the time they devote to the job and the resources that 
they possess. Incidentally, they are probably the most profes-
sional lobbyists. 
A second type of lobbyist, the good ole boy is likely de-
scribed by the same set of personal characteristics as the multi-
tactic lobbyist. This person probably knows the legislators well 
and is often involved in social activities with them like dining 
together or attending sporting events. The good ole boy lobbyist 
may also have an extensive network of contacts both inside and 
outside of the legislature. However, this person may exhibit a 
slightly smaller set of behavioral characteristics than the multi-
tactic lobbyists who has a greater variety of options at his or her 
disposal. These lobbyists should favor highly personal social 
activities. 
A Hurd type of lobbyist relies on information based appeal 
strategies rather than personal appeals. These are termed techno-
crats. Technocrats testify at hearings, help draft legislation, in-
form legislators of the effects of bills on their districts, and may 
even influence appointments. They do not develop friendships, 
probably because of state government reforms that have sought 
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to regulate the behavior of both lobbyists and lawmakers (New-
mark 2005; 2009). The technocrat lobbyist is more likely an in-
house lobbyist than contract lobbyists who may also have fos-
tered personal relationships, or grass-roots lobbyist who uses 
fewer personal or information-based appeals. In-house lobbyists 
may not have developed a contact network in the legislature, but 
they do have a great deal of experience in their issue-area (Tho-
mas and Hrebenar 2004). 
Finally, the amateurs possess few of the characteristics dis-
cussed herein. These individuals do not engage in lobbying pro-
fessionally or full-time, and they are most likely grass-roots 
lobbyists. They are likely weak lobbyists to whatever extent suc-
cess depends on personal or information-based relationships with 
legislators. In other words, they may be less proficient at their 
jobs or may resemble the amateurs discussed by Zeigler and 
Baer (1969). They are also less likely in-house or contract lob-
byists because, for these types, lobbying is the focus of their 
jobs. 
EXAMINING THE NATURE OF LOBBYING RELATIONSHIPS 
To examine the dimensionality and characteristics of lobby-
ing, a survey was conducted of lobbyists in ten states. The ten 
states-Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada , 
New Mexico, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming-were selected as 
part of a larger study to obtain variation in size, region, and other 
factors likely to characterize interest systems. The states vary in 
the number of registered lobbyists and the extent to which the 
profession is regulated. Lobby registration lists were acquired 
from the relevant administrative agency in each state.3 The over-
3 Some states were avoided because lobbyists in those states were surveyed by a number 
of scholars in recent years and their inclusion might limit the response rate. The number 
of registered lobbyists varied in the ten-state sample from 166 in Wyoming to 1,459 in 
Note continues 
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all response rate for the entire sample was 36% or 432 total sur-
veys out of the 1,250 sent. The response rate is consistent with a 
number of other lobbying studies (Hrebenar and Thomas 1993; 
Gray and Lowery 1996), and the rates across states are slightly 
more consistent. The survey was designed to elicit infom1ation 
on lobbying activities, including strategies and relationships with 
key legislators with whom the lobbyist interacts. Since many 
lobbyists represent a multitude of clients or interact with a num-
ber of legislators, the survey asked questions regarding interac-
tion with the key legislators necessary to achieve the lobbyist ' s 
goals. 
The purpose is to create two indexes relating to personal re-
lationships and information if the data support these theoretical 
assumptions. The first dimension is an index derived from eight 
of the survey questions pertaining to personal relationships. 
These questions focus on characteristics of relationships, includ-
ing activities that take place when individuals meet. Two of the 
questions, "How friendly are your relationships with key legisla-
tors?" and "How often do you meet with key legislators at social 
gather ings?, " are measured on a five-point scale ranging from 
"never" to "extremely often." The remaining six questions are 
similar to Schlozman and Tierney's (1986) questions pertaining 
to lobbying tactics, where respondents were asked whether they 
engaged in a variety of activities. The difference is that respon-
dents were asked to indicate whether they engage in the activity 
Ohio . The mean number of lobbyists was 643 (with a standard deviation of 381.36). 
Approxima tely 125 lobbyists were randomly selected from each of the ten states . The 
sampled lobbyists were typical of the lobbying population 's characteristics in each state 
even in the states with a greater number of lobbyists. The response rates by state were as 
follows: 36% in Delaware, 38% in Georgia, 35% in Iowa, 43% in Maine, 37% in Missis-
sippi, 38% in Nevada, 32% in New Mexico, 33% in Ohio, 31 % in Wisconsin, and 34% in 
Wyoming. Thirty-four surveys were subtracted from the total because they were returned 
undeliverable (some of these lobbyists were confirmed to have left the state). 
VOL. 37 2008 
12 NEWMARK 
"often," "sometimes," or "not at all,"4 in order to differentiate 
between the occasional lobbying behavior and activities that are 
done more frequently. The six activities are (1) doing favors for 
officials who need assistance, (2) engaging in informal contacts 
with officials, (3) attending social events with legislators, (4) 
dining with legislators, (5) attending entertainment such as sport-
ing events or theater with legislators, and (6) attending the same 
civic organizations such as Rotary, Lions Club, or Kiwanis 
Clubs as legislators. The index ranges from 9 to 27 with a mean 
of 17.24 and standard deviation of 3.55. The Chronbach's alpha 
of 0.82 indicates a reliable measure. 
The second dimension is another index constructed from 
eleven survey questions pertaining to information-related activi-
ties. The first three questions are measured on a five-point scale 
and ask (1) How frequently do you give technical information to 
legislators about the issues before them?; (2) How frequently do 
you give information to legislators on how the public views is-
sues before them?; and (3) How frequently do you give informa-
tion to legislators on how other legislators view the issues before 
them?5 A number of the Schlozman and Tierney (1986; cf. 
Kollman 1998) style questions are also included, and again, res-
pondents were asked whether they engaged in an activity "of-
ten," "sometimes," or "not at all." The activities are (1) testifying 
at legislative hearings, (2) contacting government officials di-
rectly to present point of view, (3) helping to draft legislation, 
( 4) alerting state legislators to the effect of a bill on their district, 
(5) consulting with governmental officials to plan legislative 
4 Since the first two questions are coded on a 5-point scale, they have additional weight 
compared to the six remaining questions. This is intentional because the first two ques-
tions focus on the core personal relationship, while the remaining six are more specific 
personal activities. 
5 Again, additional weight is given to these questions because they are central to the 
information concept. 
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strategy, (6) helping to draft agency regulations, rules, or guide-
line, (7) serving on advisory commissions or boards, and (8) at-
tempting to influence appointments to public office . The index 
ranges from 15 to 36, has a mean of 25.99, and has a standard 
deviation of 4.07. The Chronbach's alpha of 0.74 indicates a re-
liable measure. 
The survey also asked respondents how they would best cha-
racterize themselves as a lobbyist. A slight variant of the Thomas 
and Hrebenar (2004) categories was used because academics and 
survey respondents sometimes use different vernacular. The lob-
byists were asked whether they were senior executives of their 
organizations, in-house lobbyists, contract lobbyists, grass-roots 
lobbyists, or some other type of lobbyist. Thirty-nine percent 
indicated that they were senior executives (n = 165), 25% were 
in-house (n = 106), 15% (n = 62) were contract lobbyists, and 
14% were grass-roots lobbyists (n = 60).6 
Pers onal Relationships and Information-based Constructs 
In order to determine whether there are two factors affecting 
relationships between lobbyists and legislators, questions were 
chosen based on their theoretical relevance for each of the con-
structs. Confirmatory factor analysis, which is often applied in 
studies of scale measures (Kelloway, Catano, and Southwell 
1992), is used to determine how well 19 indicators load on the 
two factors . The loadings are found in Table 1. 7 Half of the indi-
cators have loadings above 0.80, and all are at least 0.42: (P5) 
6 This is consist with other studies (Gray and Lowery 1996; Thomas and Hrebenar 2004). 
7 The following eight indicators reflect the personal construct: (PI) how friendly are your 
relationships with key legislators?; (P2) how often do you meet with key legislators at 
social gatherings?; and whether the lobbyist (P3) does favors for officials, (P4) engages 
in informal contacts, (PS) attends social events, (P6) dines with legislators, (P7) engages 
in entertainmelll such as sporting events, and (P8) a/lends the same civic organizations. 
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Attending social events loads at 0.93, the (J.'2)frequency of social 
meetings loads at 0.86, (J.'6) dining with legislators has a 0.86 
loading, and (J.'7) attending entertainment/sporting events loads 
at 0.80. The loading for (J.'4) having informal contacts is 0.63, 
and (J.'3) doing favors for officials has a loading of 0.59. Ap-
parently, these are the driving force behind what constitutes 
personal relationships, though all of the indicators are impor-
tant. Two of the indicators-(Pl) how friendly are relation-
ships? and (J.'8) attends the same civic organization-have 
relatively low loadings (0.44 and 0.42). But they are theoreti-
cally relevant to the personal construct, and not so small that 
they should be excluded. 
The eleven indicators for information provision are found 
in Table 1.8 Seven of the eleven loadings are above 0.50, and 
(113) contacting officials directly, (!16) planning legislative 
strategy, and (!14) helping to draft legislation have reasonably 
large path coefficients (0.79, 0.68, and 0.67, respectively). Oth-
er activities also appear to play an important role in information 
provision such as (I12) testifying at legislative hearing (0.56), 
(Il 5) alerting of [legislators of the] effects of bills on districts 
(0.51), and (19) giving technical information (0.50). 
Though the coefficient for (Il0) giving information about 
the public is somewhat low (0.29), I have retained it in the in-
dex because there is some indication that lobbyists do provide 
information to state legislators about constituents (Kollman 
1998). There is strong theoretical reason for including this in the 
8 These include (19) give technical information, (IIO) give information about public , (11 I) 
give infom,ation about legislators, (II 2) testify at legislative hearings, (113) contact 
officials directly, (ll4) help draft legislation, (115) alert of effects of bill on district, (116) 
plan legislative strategy, (I17) help draft agency regulations , (Il8) serve 011 advisory 
boards , and (Il 9) influence appointments. 
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model, and it is more desirable to leave it in because it is some-
what relevant rather than letting the data drive the specificatio n.9 
Table 1 
A Two-factor Model of 
Personal Relation ships and Information Provision 
Indicator Description Personal 
Pl How friendly are relationships? 0.44 
P2 How often meet socially? 0.86 
P3 Favors for officials 0.59 
P4 Informal contacts 0.63 
PS Attend social events 0.93 
P6 Dining with legis lators 0.86 
P7 Entertainment , sporting events 0.80 
PS Same civic organizations 0.42 
I9 Give technical information 
II0 Give information about public 
II I Give information about legislators 
I12 Testify at legislative hearings 
Il3 Contact officials directly 
Il4 Help draft legislation 
I15 Alert of effects of bill on district 
116 Plan legislative strategy 
117 Help draft agency regulations 
II 8 Serve on advisory boards 
I 19 Influence appointments 
Chi2 923.57, df=l51 , p=0.000, RMSEA 














9 The Chronbach ' s alpha for the eleven indicators is 0.74, suggesting a reasonably relia-
ble measure . 
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The assumption is that the two constructs are actually latent 
variables and that there is a causal structure linking these con-
structs to a number of observed variables (19 in this case). The 
model includes two factors, one representing the personal con-
struct, and the other representing the information provision. LI-
SREL was used to construct the structural diagram depicted in 
Figure 1. To estimate the model, polychoric correlations were 
obtained for the 19 indicators. '0 I use maximum likelihood esti-
mation, and the model converges in 43 iterations. The Chi-
square statistic is 923 .57 with 151 degrees of freedom, and the p-
value is 0.00 with a RMSEA of 0.11. This is better than the Chi-
square statistic of 6,851.17, for the independence model with 171 
degrees of freedom. The comparative fit index (Kelloway et al. 
1992) is 0.88. Although slightly less than ideal, it does indicate 
that the model fits the data reasonably well. The standardized 
RMR is 0.096, which is .also acceptable. 
The two factors are correlated at 0.45, which is expected be-
cause personal relationships likely increase the probability of 
legislators accepting information (see Figure 1). Assuming that 
lobbyists pursue a variety of strategies when interacting with 
legislators, they will likely use both personal appeals and infor-
mation based tactics to achieve their objectives. A Nevada lob-
byist in this survey indicated this duality: "Our state has a citizen 
legislature and meets only 120 days every two years. We have 
ample time in the interim to work on issues, provide information, 
assist with constituent issues, and generally schmooze elected 
officials so we can be more effective." 
'° For categorical data, polychoric correlations are better at assessing the underlying 
relationships among variables than Pearson product-moment correlations (Joreskog 
1990). 
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Figure 2 
Single Factor Model of Relationships 
l 
have a common factor.) 11 These models did not fit the data better 
than the original model and the correlation between the two fac-
tors typically dropped by only 0.02, from 0.45 to 0.43. Thus, 
there is good support for the two-factor model. 
11 When paths were freed to allow cross-loading , the resulting coefficients were particu-
larly small . None of the loadings justified altering the specification. Specifications with 
three factors fit poorly as well. 
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Figure 1 
A Measurement Model: 
Personal Relationships a.nd Information Provision* 
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Chi - Squere=923 . 57, df=l51, P-value=0. 00000, RMSBA=0 . 112 
*The comparative fit index (CF!) for this model was 0.88 compared to a 0.60 CF! for 
the single-factor model in Figure 2. 
Still, alternative specifications of the measurement model were 
tested. Figure 2 contains the LISREL estimates of a single factor 
model that has many small loadings and a generally poor com-
parative fit index of 0.60. The two-factor model is a better fit of 
the data, however. (In an analysis not shown, I tested specifi-
cations where paths were freed and indicators were allowed to 
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Distribution of Personal Relationships and Information Provision 
So, what do these findings tell us about lobbying relation-
ships and the extent to which lobbying tactics are personally 
based or driven by information? Again, the mean personal score 
for the 432 respondents was 17.2 (3.55 std. dev.) and ranged 
from a low of 9 to a high of 27. The mean information provision 
score was 26 for the entire sample and ranged from 15 to 36, 
with a standard deviation of 4.07. Incidentally, no state varied 
significantly from the overall mean for either measure, which 
suggests similarity among the states. 12 
But what do relationships look like for the entire sample? 
Figure 3 is a scatterplot of the personal relationship and informa-
tion provision indexes. The X-axis plots information provision, 
and the Y-axis plots the personalization score. Points on the low-
er left indicate low scores on each dimension, while the upper 
right corner shows those who had high scores on both. I have 
two general comments on the pattern illustrated in Figure 3. 
First, the pattern suggests that there is variance in the spatial lo-
cale of relationships such that the relationships are not predomi-
nantly located in one area of the diagram. In other words, the 
relationships vary to the degree that they are personal and the 
extent to which information is transferred between lobbyists and 
legislators. Second, the distribution of these relationships is rela-
tively symmetrical along the diagonal, and there are very few 
outliers in the sample. However, nearly 37% of the respondents 
fell in either the upper left quadrant (good ole boys) or the lower 
right quadrant (technocrats). 
12 The personal and information score are not meant for direct comparison to each other. 
They are not standardized for ease of presentation and to allow a visual depiction of 
where the data actually fall on the plot. Furthermore, state influences on lobbying are 
outside the scope of this manuscript and are examined in another paper (Newmark 2009). 
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Earlier, I developed a typology including four categories of 
lobbyists based on the amount of information they convey and 
the extent to which their relationships are personal. In order to 










Scatterplot: Personal Relationships and 
Information Provision 
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The scatterplot uses a daisy wheel technique . A single respondent is denoted by 
a circle, and additional spokes on the wheel are added for other respondents 
who are located in the same space. 
low the means on each dimension. 13 Respondents who scored 
below the mean on both the personal and information dirnen-
13 The percentages listed in Figure 3 are partially driven by the decision regarding where 
to make the cut-offs . On both dimensions, the means and medians were nearly identical, 
so the means were chosen. Accordingly, those who scored above 17.23 were above the 
mean on the personal dimension, and those at 17 and below were below the mean. On the 
information dimension, those at 26 and above were above the mean of25 .99. 
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sions are deemed amateurs and are found in the lower left qua-
drant of the plot. One-third of the 432 lobbyists surveyed fall 
into this category. I suggested earlier that there has been a de-
cline in the good ale boy style of lobbying, and according to the 
classifications above, only 12% of the sample are labeled as 
such.14 These individuals scored above the mean on the personal 
dimension, but below the mean on the information dimension. 
They are located in the upper left corner of Figure 3. Nearly a 
fourth of the sample scored above the mean on the technical di-
mension but below the mean on the personal dimension. These 
individuals, labeled technocrats , are located in the lower right 
quadrant of the plot. The final type includes the 30% located in 
the upper right quadrant who scored above the mean on both di-
mensions. These individuals are labeled the multi-tactic lobbyist. 
It is also likely that these types of lobbyists vary in their be-
haviors. Thus, I decompose the personal and information-based 
constructs to draw some conclusions about the specific types of 
behaviors in which these individuals engage. This allows an ex-
amination of the behavioral characteristics of lobbyists in abso-
lute terms. Table 2 provides the deconstructed means for each 
dimension and its deconstructed components for all the lobbyists 
in the sample, as well as the means for each of the four lobbying 
types. is 
The multi-tactic lobbyist's mean scores for the constituent 
parts of the personal dependent variable are presented in the ta-
ble. This lobbyist had the highest mean for six out of the eight 
components , and was tied for the highest mean for an additional 
part of this construct. To name a few, the multi-tactic lobbyist 
14 Unfortunately, given the nature of the cross-sectional data, it is not possible to draw 
sr,:cific conclusions about just how much the go od ol e boys have declined . 
1 By construction, we should expect higher means for certain lobbying types . The decon-
structions do, however, allow us to examine the specific types of behaviors in which 
lobbyists engage. 
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Table 2 
Variable Component Means by Lobbying Typologies 
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17.24 14.58 20.04 15.09 20.89 Personal Dependent (3.54) (2.08) (t.95) (1.78) (2.33) 
3.44 3.13 3.67 3.24 3.86 How fiiendly are relationshipsj (0.70) (0.67) (0.59) (0.638 (0.59) 
2.88 2.36 3.55 2.37 3.64 How often Meet sociallyj (0.94) (0.69) (0.58) (0.77) (0.77) 
1.79 1.47 2.02 1.60 2.26 Favors for officials* (0.63) (0.54) (0.52) (0.53) (0.53) 
2.29 1.96 2.47 2.17 2.72 Informal contacts* (0.61) (0.54) (0.58) (0.51) (0.47) 
2 .16 1.78 2.59 1.86 2.67 Attend social events * (0.63) (0.497 (0.50) (0.45) (0.41) 
1.86 1.55 2.33 1.50 2.33 Dining with legislators* (0.64) (0.51) (0.47) (0.50) (0.51) 
1.38 I.JO 1.80 1.10 1.79 Entertainment, sporting events* (0.54) (0.31) (0.54) (0.30) (0.56) 
1.40 1.23 1.61 1.25 1.63 Same civic organizations* (0.55) (0.42) (0.61) (0.44) (.62) 
25.99 22.10 23.06 28.49 29.42 Information Dependent (4.07) (2.43) (1.79) (2.15) (2.42) 
3 .52 3.12 2.96 3.98 3.86 Give technical informationj (0.85) (0.81) (0.76) (0.70) (0.68) 
2.75 2.41 2.31 3.00 3.11 Give infom1ation about Publicj (0.91) (0.88) (0.68) (0.88) (0.90) 
2.50 2.10 2.18 2.71 2.93 Give information about legislatorsj (0.89) (0.75) (0.64) (0.90) (0.89) 
2.29 1.96 2.00 2.58 2.55 Testify at legislati ve hearings* (0.63) (0.58) (0.50) (0.55) (0.56) 
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Table 2 
Variable Component Means by Lobbying Typologies 
Dependent Variables followed 
by deconstruction 
Contact officials directly * 
Help draft legislation* 
Alert of effects of bill on district• 
Plan legislative strategy* 
Help draft agency regulations* 
Serve on Advisory Boards* 
Influence appointments* 







































































T = variable measured on a 1-5 scale . The personal dependent variable ranges from 9-
27 ; the information dependent variable ranges from 15-36. Number in parentheses is 
the standard deviation . High means in bold ; low means are italicized 
had the highest mean on survey questions dealing with how 
friendly their relationships were, how often they met socially, 
and whether they did favors for officials. 
A similar pattern emerged for the multi-tactic lobbyist for 
the information-based components of the second construct. In all 
but three of the components of the information dimension, this 
lobbyist had the highest mean score. For example, the multi-
tactic lobbyist typically had higher scores for giving information 
about constituents, giving information about the public, and serv-
ing on advisory boards. Moreover, the mean for influencing ap-
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pointments was nearly a third of a point higher for the multi-
tactic lobbyist than for any of the other categories of lobbyist. 
Summarily, the multi-tactic lobbyist engages in a variety of ac-
tivities that are both social in nature, as well as, a host of activi-
ties designed to convey information to legislators. They are like-
likely the most adaptive lobbyists and are able to tailor their lob-
bying strategies to the environment. Table 3 illustrates that 41 % 
of these individuals were senior executives of their organiza-
tions, 27% were in-house lobbyists, 23% were contract lobbyists, 
and only 3% were grass-roots lobbyists. These first three catego-
ries typically have a great deal of experience in their professions 
or in government (Thomas and Hrebenar 2004) and likely have 
extensive networks to utilize in their lobbying efforts (Heinz et 
al. 1993). Grass roots lobbyists probably lack the resources to 
utilize the multi-tactic approach. 
Looking at the components of the personal index, the good 
ole boys had the highest mean for attending entertainment or 
sporting events with legislators, and they tied for the highest 
mean for dining with lawmakers (see Table 2). It is interesting 
that these activities are among the most social of the personal 
construct, and they may resemble the good ole boys of the past. 
On the information-based construct, the good ole boys had the 
lowest means for three out of the eleven components (second 
only to the amateurs). Not surprising, the good ole boys were the 
least likely to give technical information about policy, give in-
formation about the public, and help draft agency regulations. 
Given our understanding of the behavior of these lobbyists (Ro-
senthal 2001), it would not be expected that they would provide 
detailed policy information or possess the technical skills neces-
sary to draft legislation or regulations. Since only 12% of the 
lobbyists in the sample were considered good ole boys, it is like-
ly that many lobbyists have recognized the importance of infor-
mation in their relationships with legislators, and now attempt to 
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provide it. Still, the good ole boy lobbyists were most likely se-
nior executives (37%), many were in-house lobbyists (31 %), but 
only 8% represented grass-roots organizations (see Table 3). 
Notably, contract lobbyists represent only 16% of this type of 
lobbyist, providing some indication that they are not just selling 
their ability to facilitate personal relationships. 
Table 2 suggests that the technocrat lobbyist likely provides 
technical information on policy and is apt to testify at hearings or 
alert legislators to the effects of bills on their districts. However, 
the technocrat is also the least likely to dine with legislators, 
and, along with the amateur, is equally unlikely to attend enter-
tainment or sporting events with them. But again, this is ex-
pected because technocrats specialize in information provision, 
rather than using personal appeal strategies. These lobbyists 
were typically senior executives and in-house lobbyists, but less 
likely represented grass roots organizations (see Table 3). 
The amateur lobbyist lacks the personal and information-
based appeal strategies discussed throughout this paper, but just 
how amateur are the amateurs? Table 2 shows that the amateurs 
had the lowest means on nearly all of the components of both the 
personal and information-based dimensions. With the exception 
of dining with legislators and attending entertainment or sporting 
events, the amateurs had lower means on the personal dimension 
components than the other types of lobbyists. 
Looking at the information dimension, the amateurs had the 
lowest means for all of the components of that construct, with 
the exception of giving technical information, giving information 
about the public, and helping to draft agency regulations. Al-
though the amateur lobbyists were often senior executives of 
organizations (39%) or grass-roots lobbyists (24%), of the four 
lobbying types, amateurs were less likely in-house lobbyists, 
(18%) or contract lobbyists (9%) (see Table 3). This is not sur-
pris ing since contract lobbyists or in-house lobbyists who might 
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be classified as amateurs would not last long in their positions; 
contrarily, I suspect many grass-roots firms to have non-
professional lobbyists. Some senior executives may lobby for a 
single issue (e.g. an anti-tax measure), and once the issue is ad-
dressed, they may have no further need to lobby. 
Table 3 
Lobbyist Type by Lobbyist Characteristic* 
Characteristic Amateur Good Ole Technocrat Multi-Boy tactic 
Senior Executive 39.0 36.7 39.0 41.0 
In-house 18.4 30.6 32.0 27.0 
Contract 8.8 16.3 I 1.0 23.0 
Grass-roots 23.5 8.2 13.0 3.3 
Other 10.3 8.2 5.0 5.7 
N 136 49 100 122 
Cramer's V = .18 
*Characteristics were derived from a survey question asking Which best Characteriz-
es you as a lobbyist? 
This analysis indicates that the multi-tactic lobbyists typical-
ly had the highest means on both dimensions. The multi-tactic 
lobbyist typically had a higher overall mean on the personal di-
mension than the good ole boys (20.9 v. 20), and a higher mean 
on the information dimension than the technocrats (29.4 v. 28.5). 
On the other hand, the amateurs also had a lower overall mean 
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on the personal dimension than the technocrats (14.6 v. 15.1), 
and a lower mean on the information dimension than the good 
ole boys (22.1 v. 23.1). This suggests that, from a strategic 
standpoint, there is not necessarily a finite set of tactics that lob-
byists can use in their interactions, where employing a personal 
appeal diminishes the ability to use an information-based one. 
Rather, it is possible that lobbying tactics complement each oth-
er, such that the lobbyists who are able to do favors for officials 
or meet socially are also more likely to convey information by 
testifying at legislative hearings, planning legislative strategy, or 
drafting legislation. Or, once a legislator accepts information 
from a lobbyist, a relationship develops for future interactions, 
thereby facilitating a personal relationship. Conversely, the ama-
teurs' inability to employ a given personal strategy seems to 
make conveying information even more unlikely, and their ina-
bility to disseminate information appears to make forging per-
sonal relationships with legislators more difficult. 
So, what type of lobbying has replaced the use of gifts and 
expensive dinners as a means to gain access to state lawmakers? 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare the number of good ole 
boys today to their number in the past. However, the low percen-
tage of good ole boys in this study suggests that they have indeed 
decline d. Today, to do their jobs effectively, lobbyists appear to 
add information-based appeals to their network of personal con-
tacts . Others focus solely on information provision. Despite the 
increased number of registered lobbyists in the states over the 
past few decades, many lobbyists are not effective in using per-
sonal appeals or conveying information. This is indicated by the 
fact that a third of the lobbyists in this study were deemed to be 
amateurs. Still, this may be encouraging for those concerned 
with democratic responsiveness, as it appears that a sizeable 
number of lobbying registrants are non-professionals. Whether 
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the average person can engage in lobbying and have an impact 
on policy is another story. 
CONCLUSION 
What do these findings tell us about professional relation-
ships? Perhaps a broader definition of professional relationships 
is needed. We know that lobbyists use a variety of tactics to 
achieve their objectives, ranging from going public (Kollman 
1998) to testifying at legislative hearings (Schlozman and Tier-
ney 1986; Nownes and Freeman 1998). If tactics or strategies 
are perceived as weapons in a lobbyist's arsenal, they will use 
whatever they have at their disposal to gain favor with legisla-
tors. A sizeable number of senior executives, in-house, and con-
tract lobbyists use the multi-tactic approach. However, while the 
good ale boy lobbyist might not provide large amounts of infor-
mation, he would have a highly personalized relationship with 
his legislative counterpart. Yet, this does not mean the relation-
ship is not professional. Similarly, lobbyists who provide a great 
deal of information could be perceived as having professional 
relationships even if their relationships are not necessarily per-
sonal. So, professional relationships involve the effective use of 
one or more lobbying tactic(s) in order to achieve objectives. 
Professional lobbyists are more likely than amateurs to use direct 
contacts in their lobbying (Zeigler and Baer 1969). A third of the 
lobbyists who I have termed amateurs, likely do not have fre-
quent, direct contact with legislators. Conversely, professional 
lobbyists are able to use direct contacts involving both personal 
and information-based appeals. 
These relationship patterns may apply to other political ac-
tors as well. Thus, interactions between legislators and the gov-
ernor or among law-makers and their constituents may involve a 
similar dimensionality of personal relationships and information 
provision. The successful use of these tactics probably plays an 
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important role in determining political influence. Accordingly, 
the obvious next step is to determine the effectiveness of various 
lobbying tactics in influencing legislators or at least policy out-
comes. Of course, this has been somewhat difficult to do in a 
long line of research. These findings suggest that although there 
is reasonable support that there are personal and information 
based dimensions in lobbying, the ability to utilize one set of 
strategies will facilitate the ability use another set. There may be 
little additional time or monetary cost in pursuing multiple strat-
egies, and even if there is an additional cost, it may be worth the 
added investment. 
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